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Developing Disaster:  How Developers Are Using a 
Covenant to Steal from Homeowners and Why the States 
Should Stop Them* 
I. Introduction 
In the majority of states today, homebuyers may receive an unpleasant 
surprise when they attempt to sell their home.  Included in the huge stack of 
papers signed at the purchase of the home may have been a private transfer 
fee covenant.  If the developer of the property added such a covenant, every 
time an owner sells the property for the next ninety-nine years, a full 1% of 
the purchase price is due to the developer.  This means that a couple 
purchasing their very first home, naïve and unaware of the consequences, 
may unwittingly sign a document requiring them to pay a large fee just to 
sell their home.  Companies in several states are patenting this idea and 
selling it to developers as a way to create a significant cash flow for years 
to come.  Homeowners are thus innocently drawn into a covenant they 
previously knew nothing about, with significant consequences arising down 
the road. 
As an example of how transfer fees work, assume you were to buy a 
house today.  Prior to your purchase, the developer added a transfer fee 
covenant in the chain of title which would purportedly run with the land for 
ninety-nine years.  You do not pay a transfer fee on your initial home 
purchase.  However, when you decide to sell, possibly years later, you must 
then pay a transfer fee before clear title may be transferred to the next 
buyer.  Theoretically, you paid a lower purchase price because the 
developer lowered the price after selling the right to receive future transfer 
fee covenant payments.  But before you may sell your home, you now owe 
1% of the purchase price which may be $2000 or even more.1   
Transfer fee covenants represent a sizeable step away from traditional 
property and contract law.  These covenants may dangerously inhibit 
alienability of land as well as violate the law of covenants.  A transfer fee 
covenant2 is a covenant which binds a purchaser of real property and runs 
                                                                                                                 
 * I would like to thank Professor Joyce Palomar for her topic suggestion, edits, and 
advice.  Additionally, I would like to thank my parents and baby brother for their life-long 
encouragement and support without which I would not be who I am today. 
 1. See generally R. Wilson Freyermuth, Putting the Brakes on Private Transfer Fee 
Covenants, 24 PROB. & PROP. 20, 21 (2010). 
 2. This comment will use the terms “transfer fee covenant,” “private transfer fee,” and 
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with the land for up to ninety-nine years.3  It operates by requiring each 
successive purchaser to pay 1% of the purchase price to the developer of 
the subdivision.4  A basic and historic tenet of the law of real property is 
freedom of transfer of real property, also known as alienability of land.5  
Transfer fee covenants represent a limitation on this central tenet of 
property law. 
When used by developers to bind future owners, transfer fee covenants 
transform a straightforward transfer of property between the original 
developer and the original buyer into something much more convoluted and 
difficult.  Currently, a minority of states already ban or restrict transfer fee 
covenants, either in whole or in part,6 and the federal government may soon 
do the same.7  This comment argues that, in doing so, this group of states is 
moving in the correct direction.  Restricting these covenants is both 
historically and legally correct.  This comment demonstrates that transfer 
fee covenants cannot withstand a number of legal challenges and, in failing 
at least one of these challenges, should not be permitted to bind future 
owners.   
The transfer of property is vital to our society, and it extends at least 
back to biblical times; in fact, it may extend back much farther.  For 
example, Hammurabi’s Code, which was the first written code of laws, 
mentions the transfer of property.8  At the very least, the Book of Ruth 
provides an example of an early tradition pertaining to the importance of 
the transfer of property:9  the story of the redemption of family property by 
Boaz.10  During biblical times in Israel, one party would take off a sandal 
                                                                                                                 
“transfer fee” interchangeably; however, the term “transfer fee covenant” will be used 
primarily for the sake of clarity.  
 3. Marjorie Ramseyer Bardwell & James Geoffrey Durham, Transfer Fee Rights: Is 
the Lure of Sharing in Future Appreciation a Flawed Concept?, 21 PROB. & PROP. 24, 25 
(2007); FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://freeholdcapitalpartners.com (last visited Oct. 8, 
2010). 
 4. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 3, at 25; FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 3. 
 5. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL PROPERTY 5 (1992); 
see also The Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon, 17 HARV. L. REV. 506 (1904) (exploring 
the earliest recorded exposition of the right to transfer property). 
 6. Kenneth Harney, Proposal to Ban Transfer Fees May Carry Pitfalls, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Aug. 21, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16645133.   
 7. Lew Sichelman, FHFA Moves Ahead on Rule, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Feb. 7, 
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 2412782.   
 8. The Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon, supra note 5, at 506; Russ VerSteeg, 
Early Mesopotamian Commercial Law, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 183, 196-98 (1999).  
 9. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 5 (citing Ruth 4:2, 7-11). 
 10. “Boaz . . . bought from Naomi all property of Elimelech, Kilion, and Mahlon . . .  
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and give it to another to make the transfer of property final.11  Transfers of 
property were public acts:  in some areas transfer required the presence of 
witnesses who were not merely members of the public but instead were 
“men of standing, representatives of the public power.”12  To help 
supplement the public record, ancient Israelites began memorializing the 
transfer of property with a deed.13  The deed was “an instrument that was 
signed and sealed and that contained all the terms and conditions of the 
sale.”14   
Transfer of property remains equally, if not more, important in the 
modern era.  The English system of transfer of property is slightly different 
than the American system given that each country’s modern common law 
developed under different circumstances.15  In the English system, 
Parliament does not allow conveyance of real property without a deed.16  
Conversely, while a writing is also required to convey real property in the 
American legal system, one cannot convey land itself.17  Instead, one may 
only convey an interest in that land.18  Therefore, in the American legal 
system, “[t]o state that a person has a particular interest in land is to state 
that that person enjoys certain rights of control with respect to property.”19 
Part I of this comment outlines the general structure of transfer fee 
covenants, how they are created, and how they work.  It includes a general 
overview of the legal framework surrounding covenants, how covenants are 
created, and how specific private transfer fee methods are patented and used 
by companies to bind future landowners.  Part II discusses possible legal 
challenges to transfer fee covenants and shows that transfer fee covenants 
cannot withstand those challenges.  This part also includes some of the 
rebuttal arguments in support of transfer fee covenants.  Part III shows 
several possible consequences if a state allows companies like Freehold 
Capital Partners to patent and use transfer fee covenants to bind a buyer.  
First, the transfer fee attempts to create a way for the developer to retain a 
                                                                                                                 
[and] Ruth the Moabitess, Mahlons’ widow . . . in order to maintain the name of the dead 
with his property, so that his name will not disappear from among his family or from the 
town records.  Today you are witnesses!”  Ruth 4:9 (New Int’l Version). 
 11. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 5.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. at 7-8 (tracing the differences between English and American property law). 
 16. Id. at 7. 
 17. See id. at 11.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 12.  
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right to the property without having any right to possession.  Second, the 
transfer fee covenant works as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.  
Third, transfer fee covenants create an unenforceable covenant because the 
covenant does not meet the essential requirements of the law of covenants:  
privity and the “touch and concern” element.  Finally, in the alternative, 
transfer fee covenants violate public policy and should not be enforced in 
order to protect longstanding traditions in property law.  Part IV attempts a 
moderate survey of the states’ treatment of transfer fee covenants, including 
an analysis of Oklahoma and the majority of states which, like Oklahoma, 
have not banned transfer fee covenants.  Because this comment takes the 
position that the minority of states have the correct viewpoint, it also sets 
forward the possibilities for further action that the majority of states should 
take to limit the negative influence of transfer fee covenants. 
II. How Transfer Fee Covenants Are Created; How They Operate; and Why 
Companies Are Patenting Them 
Although people have used transfer fees for many years, the term 
“transfer fee covenant” has recently become something of a buzzword.20  
Covenants imposing obligations to pay homeowners’ association dues are 
often used when developers sell land which will be governed by a 
homeowners’ association; however, transfer fee covenants are much 
different.  Although some uses for covenants may in fact benefit the 
community, transfer fee covenants are collected solely for use by a private 
party and benefit no one else.   
There are not yet any published cases specifically addressing the use of 
transfer fee covenants, but that may simply be because the idea of a private 
transfer fee covenant, like the one Freehold Capital Partners is trying to 
patent, is too novel to have caused problems which people are willing to 
take to court.  Freehold Licensing, more recently known as Freehold 
Capital Partners,21 is the most well-known of those using private transfer 
fee covenants to collect a fee every time a property is sold.22 
In total, nearly twenty state legislatures have “either restricted or banned 
the use of private transfer fees” in one form or another.23  The best-known 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 3, at 25. 
 21. Freehold Licensing, the original name, was later changed to Freehold Capital 
Partners.  This comment will use the term “Freehold” to refer to the company as a whole. 
 22. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 3. 
 23. Harney, supra note 6; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-442 (2010); CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1098 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 319 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.28 
(West 2011);765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 155/5 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.48 
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form of transfer fee covenant, which is also the most controversial, is the 
version promoted by Freehold.24  Generally, under Freehold’s plan, a 
developer creates a covenant and then is able to collect 1% of the purchase 
price every time the property is sold after the original sale.  Freehold 
designates the private transfer fee as a “Capital Recovery Fee.”25  The 
company claims that “[t]he process starts by filing a legal instrument 
(called a “Declaration of Covenant” or “Private Transfer Fee Covenant”) in 
the real property records . . . [and] [t]he result is a collateralized income 
stream.”26 
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has proposed to cut off 
federal funds or guarantees for mortgages that support private transfer fees, 
like those patented and sold by Freehold.27  The federal ban would regulate 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which account for approximately 95% of all 
mortgages.28  The proposal would prohibit a federally funded loan from 
being made on a home with a transfer fee put in place by the developer.29  It 
would only apply to homes costing greater than the limit for federal 
insurance and would not apply to businesses.30  The proposal may deter the 
use of transfer fee covenants even though it does not operate as a true ban 
on transfer fee covenants. 
Additionally, the American Land Title Association (ALTA) issued a 
press release extolling United States House of Representatives for 
protecting homeowners from transfer fee covenants by introducing The 
Homeowner Equity Protection Act of 2010, which was sponsored by U.S. 
Representative Maxine Waters.31  The act would prohibit private transfer 
                                                                                                                 
(West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3821 (2009); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 647 (2008); MD. 
CODE ANN., Real Prop. § 10-708 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. § 513.74 (2011); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 442.558 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-3 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
5301.057 (West 2010); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.017 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-
1-46 (West 2010). 
 24. Harney, supra note 6. 
 25. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 3. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Proposes Guidance to Restrict GSEs 
from Investing in Mortgages with Private Transfer Fee Covenants (Aug. 12, 2010), available at  
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/16480/PrivTransFeeGuidance081210.pdf; Harney, supra note 6. 
 28. Harney, supra note 6. 
 29. See Conforming Loan Limit, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default. 
aspx?Page=185 (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Homeowner Equity Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 6260, 111th Cong. (2010); Robert 
Franco, U.S. Congress Addresses Transfer Fee Covenants, SOURCE OF TITLE BLOG (Oct. 1, 
2010), http://www.sourceoftitle.com/blog_node.aspx?uniq=689. 
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fees if the transfer for which the fee is imposed involves a federally related 
mortgage.32  A second proposal, The Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure 
Act of 2010, introduced by U.S. Representative Phil Gingrey, would require 
a notice paper to be filed in the county recorder’s office for any private 
transfer fee placed on land.33  Importantly, the act does not appear to require 
notice to a homeowner before the original purchase.  The disclosure 
requirement seems to mirror California’s disclosure requirement.34  The 
Gingrey bill also provides an additional safeguard to protect private transfer 
fees:  if a transfer fee covenant “imposes a transfer fee of not more than 1 
percent of the gross sales price for the affected property, effective for a term 
of not more than 99 years” it is presumed valid.35  A federal law might 
effectively preempt state laws banning transfer fees.36  Even more 
problematic, the Gingrey bill would allow only one covenant, which means 
that traditional housing associations’ covenants would likely be preempted 
by a covenant added to the land by the developer, who often is the first to 
add a covenant because they make the original sale.37 
Many terms describe transfer fee covenants: capital recovery fees, home 
resale fees, reconveyance fees, recovery fees, resale fees, and private 
transfer fee covenants; all of these terms refer to the same basic property 
concept.38  Under any name, the fundamental idea is that a covenant is 
recorded in the chain of title, the servitude attaches to the land for ninety-
nine years, and the burden runs with the land to bind future owners.39  After 
the agreement or covenant is attached to the land, 1% of any future sale 
price must go back to the original covenantors or to whomever they sold the 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Harney, supra note 6.  
 33. Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure Act of 2010, H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. (2010).   
 34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098.5(a) (West 2008); see discussion infra Part V.B.  
 35. Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure Act of 2010, H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. § 3(c) 
(2010).  This provision safeguards the covenant from being invalid.  It does not, however, 
help the homeowner since a 1% fee on a $300,000 home is still $3000.   
 36. This raises an interesting question of the implications on federalism and the balance 
of states’ power to regulate the property laws for their citizens versus the federal 
government’s power to do so.  Questions like this will likely be raised by Congress as they 
debate the bills proposed; however, that question is beyond the scope of this comment and 
will not be discussed in depth.  
 37. H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. § 3(d) (2010). 
 38. Field Guide to Private Transfer Fees, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, 
http://www.realtor. org/field-guides/field-guide-to-private-transfer-fees (last visited Apr. 25, 
2012).  However, for the sake of consistency, this comment will generally refer to the 
concept as a whole as a transfer fee covenant.  
 39. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 3, at 25.  
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right to receive payment, which generally includes the company that 
licenses the use of the system and the real estate broker.40   
A complicated system controls the sale of transfer fee covenants and the 
licenses required to use them.41  Before a sale takes place, a broker 
approaches an initial seller regarding the use of a transfer fee covenant to 
give a covenantor the future share, or earnings, of the property.42  The 
broker then collects an initial commission and also may get a share in future 
earnings of the transfer fee covenant:  “The licensor pays for this interest 
with a note for an amount that is estimated to be the value of those future 
sums generated by the servitude.”43  There is no way to predict, though, 
how often or for how much the house will be sold.44  This allows the 
covenantor, as Freehold termed it, to “sit back, relax, and wait for the 
money to flow in.”45 
Future purchasers of the property may have ways to opt out but opting 
out is complicated.46  Opt outs include three possibilities:  payment of the 
transfer fee, buying out the covenant if more than five years has expired 
since the covenant was made, and granting an option to the person to whom 
the transfer fee is owed in lieu of the payment.47 
In conclusion, transfer fee covenants are created by developers and often 
patented by companies like Freehold in order to receive profit continuously 
from a property as well as to reduce the original buy-in price of property.  
While case law on point is sparse, there is vehement opposition to transfer 
fee covenants by those intimately acquainted with the field of property law:  
the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the American Land Title Association, 
and several House and Senate members from both the Democratic and 
Republican parties.48  Transfer fee covenants operate like many other 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 25-26.  
 42. Id. at 25. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 26. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 26-28. 
 47. Id. at 27. 
 48. ALTA Supports FHFA Proposal to Ban Private Transfer Fees, AM. LAND TITLE 
ASS’N (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.alta.org/news/news.cfm?newsID=12355; see also 
Jennifer Hiller, Federal Plan Likely to Curb Transfer Fees on Real Estate Deals, HOUS. 
CHRON., Dec. 25, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 25483861; Jennifer Waters, Watch for 
Private Real-Estate Transfer Fees: Some Developers Add a 1% Fee to Cover Infrastructure 
Costs, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/watch-for-real-
estate-transfer-fees-2010-11-01.  
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covenants used for years without opposition.  However, there are stark 
differences between private transfer fee covenants and the less controversial 
covenants. 
III. Possible Legal Challenges to Transfer Fee Covenants 
A transfer fee covenant is unlikely to survive any of the legal challenges 
discussed in this section.  However, as already mentioned, the court system 
has yet to see a case in order to test these proposed challenges.49  State 
legislatures, attempting to address the issue before the courts have a chance 
to hear a case, have tried to save potential homeowners and buyers from the 
possible repercussions of transfer fee covenants.  Thus, while transfer fee 
covenants currently remain unchallenged, that will likely change as they 
become more popular. 
At least three possible legal challenges to the use of transfer fee 
covenants exist.  First, transfer fee covenants violate traditional property 
law principles by allowing a party to have a right to property without any 
right to possession, either currently or in the future.50  Second, transfer fee 
covenants violate a fundamental tenant of property law by inhibiting the 
alienability of land.51  Third, property law has traditionally required a 
covenant to “touch and concern” the land as well as meet the requirement 
of privity between the parties in order to run with the land and bind future 
parties.52  However, private transfer fees meet none of these fundamental 
requirements.  Additionally, private transfer fees violate public policy by 
making the transfer of property so complex that experts are necessary.  
They should not be enforced for the basic reason of protecting buyers and 
sellers of property. 
A. The Transfer Fee Attempts to Create a Way for the Developer to Retain 
a Right to the Property Without Having Any Right to Possession  
“The Restatement of Property defines an estate as involving the present 
or future right to possession[;]”53 however, private transfer fees “attempt[ ] 
to create an interest in the fee simple without any right to possession.”54  A 
brief background on how property law treats estates and a person’s interest 
in land is helpful here.  An “estate” means an interest in land that “is or may 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See discussion supra Part II. 
 50. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 3, at 28.   
 51. Id. at 28-29. 
 52. Id. at 29.  
 53. Id. at 28. 
 54. Id.  
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become possessory.”55  The term applies to all interests which are created 
by a conveyance and is “defined by how long possession or use may last.”56  
Special limitations, conditions subsequent, or conditions precedent can limit 
interests in an estate.57  A “conveyance gives its owner either (i) the right to 
enjoyment of land immediately following the conveyance or (ii) the right to 
potential enjoyment beginning in the future.”58  Additionally, conveyances 
create either a corporeal interest or an incorporeal interest.59  A corporeal 
interest is a possessory interest, meaning a right to possess the land.60  In 
contrast, an incorporeal interest only gives the owner a right to use instead 
of a right to full possession of the land:61  “Although at one time the list of 
incorporeal interests was quite long, in modern American law there are only 
three of importance:  (1) the profit a pendre, (2) the easement, and (3) the 
rent.”62 
The three major incorporeal interests play different roles in the law of 
real property.  A profit a prendre allows the owner to take products from the 
land, for example, in an oil and gas “lease.”63  An easement, on the other 
hand, can be either an affirmative or negative easement.64  Affirmative 
easements entail “the right to use servient land for a purpose other than the 
removal of its fruits.”65  For example, affirmative easements include 
easements of access and utility easements.66  Negative easements are those 
created by grant, reservation, or by estoppel,67 and are limited to light, air, 
view, support, and the right to receive water.68  Because of the limitations 
placed on the creation of easements, the need for alternate mechanisms 
arose “for the enforcement of appropriate ‘noneasement’ interests by and 
                                                                                                                 
 55. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 9(a) (1936). 
 56. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 13-14. 
 57. Id. at 14.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 15. 
 60. Id. at 16. 
 61. Id. at 17. 
 62. Id. at 18. 
 63. Id. at 18-19. 
 64. Id. at 19-20. 
 65. Id. at 19. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 19-20. 
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against remote owners of the properties involved.”69  Finally, rents are 
usually created by term leases.70 
Given the foregoing summary of estates, it becomes obvious that transfer 
fee covenants create an interest in land without concurrently creating any of 
the traditional or otherwise valid property interests described.  Proponents 
of transfer fee covenants, however, argue that a “transfer fee is an 
encumbrance [-] it is not an ownership interest in the home.”71  Proponents 
add that “few if any homes are sold free of encumbrances.”72  With most 
homes, the buyer knows or assumes there will be an “obligation to comply 
with subdivision restrictions, pay dues and assessments, grant easements to 
utility companies, etc., all of which are encumbrances against the land.”73  
Additionally, proponents argue that “most residential homes do not convey 
the mineral rights, oil rights, and, when it comes to commercial property, 
the air rights.”74  
Notwithstanding, private transfer fee covenants are an attempt to create 
an invalid property interest.  The interest created by these covenants gives 
someone an interest in land even though that party has no right to either 
current or future possession of the property.  The holder of the right to 
receive the fee has no actual rights to the property, only the right to receive 
payment.  Additionally, the created covenant quite obviously does not 
fulfill the requirements of a negative easement.  Thus, private transfer fee 
covenants attempt to create an invalid covenant between parties and should 
not be enforced by a court.   
B. Transfer Fee Covenants Work as an Unreasonable Restraint on 
Alienation 
Private transfer fee covenants violate a fundamental tenet of fee simple 
property ownership.  Owners in fee simple have the ability to convey their 
land at any point they wish.75  The ability to convey a whole or part interest 
in land is the core of fee simple ownership.  A “private transfer fee 
covenant impedes future land transactions by imposing additional 
                                                                                                                 
 69. ROGER BERNHART ET AL., PROPERTY CASES AND STATUTES 344 (2d ed. 2009).  
 70. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 20. 
 71. Common Myths About Private Transfer Fees, PLUS NEWS, Aug. 30, 2010, available 
at 2010 WLNR 17465882. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Bardwell & Durham, supra note 3, at 28. 
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unwarranted transaction costs.”76  Under property law, a covenant is not 
allowed to stop or restrict the free alienability of land if land is held in fee 
simple.77  But a transfer fee covenant requires large sums of money, a full 
1% of the purchase price, to be paid to the original covenantor by 
subsequent purchasers, sometimes many years after the original agreement 
is made.78  A seller may also incur additional fees beyond those imposed by 
the transfer fee covenant because the developer may have sold the right to 
collect the fee and the seller then has to locate the holder of that right.79  
Additionally, the transfer fee may have to be escrowed if the holder of the 
right to collect the fee cannot be found.80  Both seller and buyer may incur 
further costs in negotiating which party ultimately pays the fee associated 
with the covenant.81  The buyer may also incur additional expenses 
negotiating with a title insurer over the form of the insurer’s exception for 
the covenant and even more expense in obtaining financing if the mortgage 
lender “insists on obtaining subordination of the transfer covenant lien.”82   
Finally, if enforceable, a buyer of land may try to impose further transfer 
fee covenants to recoup the costs spent in the transfer of the property which, 
over time, could create additional complications from stacking of multiple 
transfer fee covenants.83  This is especially troublesome in states with 
absolutely no law restricting who can add a transfer fee covenant to a deed.  
A multitude of transfer fee covenants may then encumber the buyer as well 
as the property for a long period of time.   
All of these factors demonstrate that transfer fee covenants impede a 
seller’s ability fully to convey land and controvert society’s value of free 
alienability of land.  Since a transfer fee covenant may inhibit an owner 
from freely transferring land, it should be invalidated as a violation of this 
important value of property law. 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 23.   
 77. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.1 (1952). 
 78. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 23.  However, Freehold, in their brochure, says that 1% 
of the purchase price is a “de minimus” fee.  FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, LEARN HOW 
CAPITAL RECOVERY FEE INSTRUMENTS CAN HELP YOU (n.d.), available at http://www. 
freeholdcapitalpartners.com/forms/ 
freehold_brochure.pdf. 
 79. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 23. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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C. Transfer Fee Covenants Create an Unenforceable Covenant Because the 
Covenant Does Not Meet the Essential Requirements: “Touch and 
Concern” and Privity 
Even property experts admit that the law of covenants is a very confused 
area of law.84  Because it mixes traditional contract principles and property 
law principles it is necessary first to survey the law of covenants.85  Once 
one has a broad understanding of the law, both traditionally and as it seems 
to be trending today, it becomes obvious that transfer fee covenants lack at 
least two essential requirements.  Therefore, transfer fee covenants cannot 
run with the land to bind future owners.  First, transfer fee covenants do not 
touch or concern the land, thus, future owners of the property cannot be 
bound by these covenants.  Second, transfer fee covenants cannot create or 
meet at least one of the privity requirements of the law of covenants.  
Future owners should not be bound by a covenant created, at least in part, 
by a private and uninterested third party.   
1. Introduction to the Law of Covenants 
In American common law, the law of covenants developed because land 
is different than other property:  land is immovable and illiquid and the 
magnitude of financial investment involved in a land purchase is generally 
much greater than that invested in other property.86  Therefore, although it 
may seem strange that land can hold a contractual burden from decades 
earlier, the doctrine of covenants is, and was, designed “to address the 
heavy and unique losses” that can occur regarding land.87 
The underlying purpose of the covenant doctrine was to impose criteria 
required to make covenants run with or “stick” to the land such that the law 
enforces only those covenants that “(1) protect dominant owners from 
losses not readily protected by the market and (2) are consistent with the 
servient owner’s ability to avoid nonconsensual obligations.”88  In other 
words, the “law enforces covenants if noncompliance costs are high and 
avoidance costs are low.”89  Courts tend to be more likely to allow benefits 
to run with the land than burdens.90  Specifically, courts restrict burdens by 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Affirmative Covenants as Running with the Land, 68 
A.L.R. 2D 1022 (1959). 
 85. See generally id. (describing the mixed legal nature of covenants). 
 86. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 350-51. 
 87. Id. at 351. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Shipley, supra note 83, at 1022.  
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requiring “property privity between either the original parties or those 
parties and their successors, or both, and that the promise involved be one 
which ‘touches and concerns’ the land.”91  This is especially true when an 
affirmative covenant is involved whereby the promisor may be subjected to 
burdensome obligations which are much greater than the land’s value.92  
For a covenant to run with the land and bind a subsequent owner the 
covenant must meet at least three criteria.93  First, the grantor and grantee 
must intend for it to do so.94  Second, the covenant must touch and concern 
the land.95  Third, privity of estate between the original parties, between the 
original parties and the present litigant, or between the party claiming the 
benefit of the covenant and the party burdened is required.96   
In other words, for a covenant to run with the land, the parties need a 
contract, intent that the burden run, a burdened estate, a covenant which 
touches or concerns the land, and horizontal benefit.97 
a) The Requirement of a Contract, Intent, and a Burdened Estate 
Generally, a contract must be in writing and signed by the promisor.98  A 
writing is required for the transfer of land because of the statute of frauds, 
which aims to ensure that evidence is available to a prospective purchaser.99  
If the covenant is in a deed, even the most restrictive evidentiary 
requirements of jurisdictions are met.100  
Second, the requirement of intent provides that a covenant, if it is 
regarding something not in esse,101 must contain explicit language 
regarding the promisor’s assigns, which means they must be explicitly 
mentioned or they are not bound.102  However, as a practical matter, “since 
it is customary to use the technical word ‘assigns’ in instruments containing 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Jeremiah 29:11, Inc. v. Seifert, 161 P.3d 750, 753 (Kan. 2007); see also Inwood N. 
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987); Neponsit Prop. Owners’ 
Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1938).  Note that these cases 
impose a range of criteria, but this comment will focus on three. 
 94. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants § 20 (2010).  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 353-58. 
 98. Id. at 354. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. In esse means “in actual existence.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (9th ed. 2009).  
 102. See generally Spencer’s Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B.) (establishing the 
explicit language requirement). 
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covenants, problems as to the application of this in esse doctrine are not 
frequent.”103  Some states do not follow the rule from Spencer’s Case,104 
meaning explicit language regarding the promisor’s assigns is not 
necessary, but they do still require intent that the covenant run with the 
land.105   
Third, to meet the requirement of a burdened estate, the covenant must 
burden some interest in land.106  This can be any estate held by the 
covenantee, but “in a few states . . . a present possessory interest in fee 
simple absolute granted simultaneously with the execution of the covenant 
cannot be a burdened estate unless it is also a benefited estate.”107 
b) The Requirement That the Covenant Touch and Concern the Land 
Another element is that the covenant must touch and concern the land.108  
There is no real consensus on the definition of the touch and concern 
element; generally, however, purely financial covenants do not touch and 
concern the land.109  A brief survey of the touch and concern element begins 
with the rule in Spencer’s Case which “established the requirement for 
running of the covenant that it ‘touch or concern’ the land”110 and continues 
to the Restatement of Property where the element is not found.111  Under 
any definition, however, a private transfer fee covenant cannot meet the 
requirement of “touching and concerning” the land, and, is therefore an 
invalid covenant which does not bind later parties. 
“A covenant touches and concerns the land if it affects the use, value, 
and enjoyment of the property,”112 that is, for the requirement that the 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Howard R. Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Covenants Running with the 
Land at Law, 27 TEX. L. REV. 419, 428 (1949).  
 104. The rule in Spencer’s Case is that a covenant can be binding upon a third party if 
there is intent to bind the party, the covenant touched and concerned the land, and there was 
privity.  Spencer’s Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B.); see also NATELSON, supra note 5, at 
355.  “The resolutions of Spencer’s Case requiring that the covenant relate to something in 
esse, or in the alternative, that assigns be specifically mentioned in the instrument containing 
the covenant, in order that it run with the land, have become of less importance in a number 
of jurisdictions.”  Williams, supra note 102, at 423-24.   
 105. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 354-55 (internal citations omitted). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 355.  
 108. Id. at 353-58. 
 109. Williams, supra note 102, at 429-30; see also NATELSON, supra note 5, at 356-58.   
 110. Williams, supra note 102, at 429. 
 111. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 354-55; see also Spencer’s Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 
72 (K.B.). 
 112. In re Cnty. Treasurer, 869 N.E.2d 1065, 1078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting U.S. Fid. 
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covenant must touch and concern the land, the “covenant must limit the use 
or enjoyment of the servient owner’s land.”113  Originally, the common law 
utilized this requirement to guard against unreasonable restraints on 
alienation.114  A “promise touches or concerns both the servient and the 
dominant land if, by reason of physical locations of the servient and 
dominant parcels, violation of the promise would cause harm to the 
dominant owner that substitutionary relief could not cure.”115 
Generally, a purely financial covenant cannot touch and concern the 
land.116  For example, a covenant to pay money for a property owners’ 
association or to a developer with authority over the property generally 
does run with the land; however, when the money is not for purposes that 
relate to the land’s value, the covenant does not touch and concern the 
land.117  If stated in the affirmative, this seems to mean that if a covenant 
does relate to the land’s value, then it does touch and concern the land.  
Proponents of transfer fees have raised a tenuous argument that a private 
transfer fee covenant touches and concerns the land because it reduces the 
financial value homeowners may receive for selling their home; however, 
because the increase or possible decrease in value cannot be calculated with 
certainty, this is a difficult argument to make.  As another example, a 
covenant just to pay insurance does not run, but if that covenant is coupled 
with a covenant to invest the insurance proceeds in restoring the damaged 
premises, then that covenant does run.118  As time has passed, more and 
more covenants to pay money have been held to “touch or concern,” and 
this trend shows an attitude or belief that adequate damages cannot be 
awarded and that courts should grant specific relief instead.119  Also, rent 
always counts as “touching and concerning” land, but “[b]ecause the 
payment of rent is not even indirectly connected to the land, this judicial 
solidarity is somewhat remarkable.”120  Additionally, there are exceptions 
                                                                                                                 
& Guar. Co. v. Old Orchard Plaza Ltd., 672 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 113. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 356. 
 114. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 21-22. 
 115. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 354-55.  
 116. See id. at 356-57.   
 117. Id. at 357. 
 118. Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340, 340 (1859). 
 119. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 356-57 (citing ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW 
OF PROPERTY, 471-472 (1984); Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1990)).   
 120. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 477 (3d ed. 
2000).  
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for homeowners’ associations’ use of funds to benefit the burdened land 
and common areas appurtenant to it; however, that is very different from a 
developer or third party receiving funds for the transfer of property.121  
Thus, while an argument can be made that a purely financial covenant, such 
as a private transfer fee covenant, does meet the touch and concern element, 
the argument is a tenuous one.  Most courts holding that purely financial 
covenants “touched and concerned” the land have not discussed a covenant 
which was solely for the benefit of a private third party.122 
The more recent view of the “touch and concern” element shows the 
trend is moving away from requiring physical touching of the land.123  The 
so-called Clark-Bigelow test124 “relates benefit and burden to the estates 
instead of to physical land, and [ ] measures benefit and burden by 
economic impact.”125  Seemingly, the Restatement of Servitudes 3rd does 
away completely with the touch or concern standard; however, it ends up 
being similar to the Clark-Bigelow test.126  Thus, the most updated 
Restatement of Servitudes adopts the idea that the touch and concern 
element is centered on intent rather than physical touching.127  The majority 
of courts, however, still require physical touching.128  Therefore, for a 
majority of courts, a purely financial arrangement between a private third 
party and the original buyer would not be able to bind a later, successive 
buyer. 
c) The Requirement of Privity 
The final element, the requirement of privity, is complicated, and often 
presents the “greatest conflict” in cases regarding covenants and property 
law.129  This element is best split into horizontal and vertical privity.  
Horizontal privity is the “property relationship between original 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 21-22.  See generally Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. 
Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938). 
 122. See discussion infra III.C.2 (discussing some relevant cases). 
 123. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 119, at 479.   
 124. Judge Clark seems to have approved of a test formulated by Professor Bigelow, 
which can be summarized as “a measuring of the legal relations of the parties with and 
without the covenant.”  Williams, supra note 102, at 429-30.  In other words, the benefit or 
burden touches or concerns the land when the owner’s legal interest is rendered more or less 
valuable by the promise.  Id.   
 125. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 119, at 479. 
 126. Id. at 480 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 5.2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1991)). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Williams, supra note 102, at 440. 
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covenanting parties at the time of contracting.”130  It “is either established 
once and for all at the time of contracting or it is never established for that 
covenant.”131  Vertical privity means that a later owner must be the 
promisor’s successor.132  The question of who is a successor depends on the 
jurisdiction, but the majority rule is that for a person to be bound at law, he 
must have succeeded to the identical estate held by the original promisor.133  
Jurisdictions differ as to exactly when chain of privity is broken,134 and 
there seems to be little consensus as to whether the chain of privity is 
broken when a property is transferred by lease, adverse possession, or 
foreclosure sale.135 
Professor Williams gives a spectrum of five general views regarding 
when the requirement of privity is satisfied by the type of relationship the 
parties have.136  The first and most narrow view requires that the “[t]enure 
relationship [be] between the covenantor and covenantee.”137  Second, some 
jurisdictions require the parties to have “simultaneous mutual interests in 
the same tract of land . . . which may have been created prior to the 
covenant or may be created by the instrument creating the covenant.”138  
This second view is broader than the first because privity will exist when 
there is a tenure relationship, as in the first, or when one party owns an 
interest, like an easement.139  Third, what may be the majority view 
according to Professor Williams, privity “means a succession of interest in 
land between the covenantor and the covenantee.”140  Generally, a deed in 
fee simple will suffice in these jurisdictions.141  Fourth is the hybrid 
position accepted by the Restatement of Property.142  This view requires “a 
privity of either succession of or simultaneous interests between covenantor 
and covenantee” as well as “some compensating benefit to other land 
justifying the running of the burden.”143  This differs slightly as to benefits 
                                                                                                                 
 130. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 358 (emphasis removed). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 358-59. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 359. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Williams, supra note 102, at 440-45.   
 137. Id. at 440.   
 138. Id. at 441. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.; see also NATELSON, supra note 5, at 358-59.   
 142. Williams, supra note 102, at 442. 
 143. Id. 
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because it seems that “the only privity required is the mere promise or 
covenant itself.”144  Fifth, “the most liberal concept of privity” is the view 
that privity “merely requires a succession of interest on the part of assignees 
by or against whom the covenant is sought to be enforced.”145  Under this 
view, privity “does not refer to any relationship between the covenantor and 
covenantee.”146  Obviously, which view is taken will depend on the 
particular jurisdiction; however, the law is not always clear even within this 
system.  Professor Williams states that “[m]athematically, there are twenty-
five permutations of these five basic meanings of privity.”147  Additionally, 
the requirement in each jurisdiction may change depending on whether the 
covenant at issue is either a benefit or burden.148 
d) The Requirements for a Benefit to Run with the Land 
The above discussion summarizes what elements are required for a 
burden to run with the land.  The requirements for a burden are explained in 
detail because the majority of the arguments regarding transfer fee 
covenants classify them as a burden on the land.  However, there are also 
elements, which differ slightly from those discussed above, for a benefit to 
run with the land.149  For example, a typical covenant used by a 
homeowners’ association, which can be analogized in many ways to 
Freehold’s transfer fee covenant, imposes fees on each homeowner to pay 
for the common areas and maintenance.150  These fees benefit the owners 
both directly and indirectly:151  first, by providing things like pools or parks, 
and second, by “preserving/raising property values because of the presence 
of valued amenities.”152  Since the Neponsit case, courts have consistently 
“held that both the burden and benefit of a lot assessment covenant ‘touch 
and concern’ land and bind successor owners of that land.”153  This makes 
sense because the effect on alienability is negligible while the land is 
significantly more attractive to buyers because of the added amenities.154  
Thus, while some may classify a transfer fee covenant as a burden on the 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 443. 
 148. Id. 
 149. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 359-61. 
 150. See Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 21-22. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 22. 
 154. Id. 
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land, it is helpful to understand the requirements of benefits when 
considering arguments which take a different stance.   
If a benefit exists, for that benefit to run with the land it is necessary to 
have a contract between the original parties, intent, a dominant estate, 
“touch or concern,” horizontal privity, and vertical privity.155  Many 
elements sound the same, but applied in the benefit context, some are 
slightly different.156  For a contract, a benefit depends on the same 
requirements as those for a burden to run with the land.157  Also, similar to a 
burden, for the element of intent, if the parties intend that only the original 
promisee enforce, then the covenant does not run.158  For the “touch or 
concern” element, some argue the benefit of the real covenant must be of a 
kind that enhances the use or enjoyment of particular land, but Robert G. 
Natelson, in the Modern Law of Deeds to Real Property, argues that the 
“touch or concern” test applies to the dominant and the servient estate 
simultaneously:159  “The promise touches or concerns if, by reason of the 
physical positions of the servient and dominant land, violation of that 
promise would cause harm to the dominant owner that substitutionary relief 
could not cure.”160   
Generally for a benefit to run, horizontal privity is required.  However, 
according to the Restatement of Property 3rd, horizontal privity is not 
necessary for a benefit to run.161  Some jurisdictions make the law clear in 
this area, but in jurisdictions where the law is more muddled, it is generally 
safe to assume privity is necessary.162  The requirements for vertical privity 
for benefits are the same as the requirements for burdens except that 
“tenants and sublessees may enforce promises made for the benefit of 
estates held by their landlords.”163  
2. Transfer Fee Covenants Do Not “Touch and Concern” the Land 
The “touch and concern” element is the most contentious element of the 
requirements for a covenant to run with the land.  Private transfer fee 
covenants, such as those used by Freehold, do not “touch and concern” the 
                                                                                                                 
 155. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 359-60. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 360. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, §§ 534, 542. 
 162. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 360-61. 
 163. Id. at 361. 
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land.  In their most recent brochure, Freehold claims that “the touch and 
concern doctrine has been largely abandoned in favor of a contract 
approach,” and that even if a jurisdiction does not follow this modern 
approach, Freehold’s covenants do meet the “touch and concern” 
requirement.164  Under the modern approach, adopted by the Restatement of 
Property 3rd, many covenants have been held to bind subsequent owners in 
situations similar to the one Freehold claims their covenant creates.165  
However, private transfer fees are a purely financial burden which should 
not bind future owners even under the modern Restatement.  Rents and 
homeowners’ association fees for common areas, as a financial burden, 
have traditionally been held to touch and concern.166  Generally, however, 
courts do not hold that a solely financial burden regarding the land is one 
which touches and concerns the land, and the narrow circumstances 
described above are customarily the only time such financial covenants are 
held to touch and concern.167 
Additionally, the central tenant of the most recent Restatement of 
Property is the intent of the parties.168  However, the Restatement did not 
utterly abandon the “touch and concern” element.  Instead, it seems to have 
merged that element into the intent of the parties.169  Courts following the 
principles of the modern Restatement do not specifically look for “touch 
and concern;” courts look instead to intent, which can have hints of the 
“touch and concern” element included in the analysis.170  Although there 
has been a proliferation of private transfer fee covenants since the 
Restatement of Property 3rd because of the intent-based view, courts 
should still refuse to hold that a private transfer fee covenant touches and 
concerns the land because this would be a dangerous and novel approach.171  
                                                                                                                 
 164. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 77, at 10.  
 165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (2000); see also Inwood N. 
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987) (holding a declaration of 
covenants recorded for an entire subdivision effective to create lien on later purchasers for 
the homeowners’ association fees).  But see Garland v. Rosenshein, 649 N.E.2d 756, 758 
(Mass. 1995) (holding public policy concerns weighed against enforcing a burdensome 
covenant restriction since it did not touch or concern the land). 
 166. See Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 21-22. 
 167. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 119, at 477. 
 168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.1. 
 169. Locke Lake Colony Ass’n v. Town of Barnstead, 489 A.2d 120, 122 (N.H. 1985) 
(holding that the intent of the parties was the integral element; however, only after all formal 
requirements were satisfied).  
 170. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 171. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 22-23. 
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The common law developed partially to protect people from covenants 
which unreasonably restrained alienation.  The modern Restatement has not 
completely abandoned these principles, and courts should continue to find 
that covenants which solely benefit an uninterested third party do not run 
with the land. 
In jurisdictions which still adhere to the more traditional definition of the 
law of covenants, courts look to whether the “touch and concern” element 
is satisfied.172  In these jurisdictions, a purely financial arrangement with a 
third, uninterested party, does not “touch and concern” the land.  Private 
transfer fee covenants are different from financial burdens associated with 
rent or homeowners’ associations, which are financial burdens that do touch 
and concern the land.  Transfer fee covenants involve a private third party 
uninterested in the land or home itself:  “By the time the developer collects 
a future transfer fee, the developer likely will have completed the sale of all 
affected lots and will have no legal interest (other than the transfer fee 
rights) in the community.”173  Therefore, “the benefit of a private transfer 
fee is personal to the developer.”174  In other words, the covenant is “in 
gross” and cannot, by the vast authority of common law courts, run with the 
land to bind later purchasers.175 
Therefore, a company adding a transfer fee covenant, like Freehold, is an 
uninterested third party which cannot create a covenant that “touches and 
concerns” the land.  As such, the covenant does not affect the land and 
cannot run with the land to bind later purchasers.  A developer’s personal 
interest in receiving a fee, which is often sold to yet another party, should 
not be held to bind a future purchaser since the developer’s interest is 
unconnected to any parcel of land.  Additionally, if a jurisdiction follows 
the modern view, focused more specifically on each party’s intent in 
creating the covenant, courts should still refuse to find that a private 
transfer fee covenant runs with the land to bind future purchasers.  Even 
these jurisdictions have not completely abandoned the “touch and concern” 
element and courts should refrain from enforcing covenants which have 
absolutely no bearing on the land itself and benefit only a private third 
party.   
                                                                                                                 
 172. Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 
1938); see also Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987). 
 173. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 22. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.; see Bremmeyer Excavating, Inc. v. McKenna, 721 P.2d 567, 568-69 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1986). 
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3. Transfer Fee Covenants Do Not Meet the Requirement of Privity 
Privity is required between the parties to a covenant.176  Freehold, in their 
literature about the legality of transfer fee covenants, does not even mention 
the concept of privity.177  Given that it must be established at the time of 
contracting or not at all, one assumes that horizontal privity must be 
established between the developer and the original purchaser.  However, the 
type of privity necessary is dependent on the jurisdiction, and the modern 
view, as adopted by the Restatement of Property 3rd is that solely vertical 
privity is required for a benefit or burden to run with the land and bind 
successors.178 
Private transfer fee covenants, because they are created with a third party 
unconnected to the land, do not establish vertical privity.179  Thus, even if a 
court were to find that the covenant did, in fact, “touch and concern” the 
land, the court should find that privity was not established and thus the 
covenant is invalid.  Privity is not established primarily because the 
company holding a right to payment cannot be classified as any of the 
parties traditionally labeled as a party with privity in creating a covenant.180  
Under the first four of Professor Williams’ five views of privity, there is a 
colorable argument that Freehold, as a private third party uninterested in the 
land at issue, does not meet the essential requirement of privity in order to 
form a valid and binding covenant.181   
First, in a jurisdiction requiring a tenure relationship between covenantor 
and covenantee, companies like Freehold do not hold the traditional 
positions required by law.182  In these most stringent jurisdictions, courts 
would have a very difficult time finding the privity requirement satisfied.   
Under Professor Williams’ second view, a jurisdiction should also find 
the privity requirement unsatisfied.  Again, a jurisdiction adopting this view 
would have to find that the developer and the later buyer had “simultaneous 
mutual interest in the same tract of land.”183  While that interest may have 
                                                                                                                 
 176. Williams, supra note 102, at 440-46.   
 177. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 77.  
 178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.4 cmt. b (2000); see also 
Gallagher v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1028, 1036-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).  Contra Runyon v. 
Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177, 184 (N.C. 1992) (holding both vertical and horizontal privity 
necessary); see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 534 (1944). 
 179. See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 180. NATELSON, supra note 5, at 358-59. 
 181. See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 182. See generally Austerberry v. Corp. of Oldham, 29 Ch. D. 750 (1885).  
 183. Williams, supra note 102, at 441-45. 
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been created pre-covenant or with the covenant, the mutual interest is not 
satisfied by private transfer fees.  A third party, such as Freehold, never had 
a mutual interest with the contracting party in the land.  Instead, their 
interest is only in the later transfer of that land and receipt of a fee.  In fact, 
upon the first original transfer, Freehold’s covenant does not even come 
into effect.184  Instead, the 1% transfer fee is only paid upon the sale to a 
secondary, further removed, party.185   
Under the third (and majority) view, privity requires “a succession of 
interest in land between the covenantor and the covenantee, . . . which 
succession in interest must be at the time the covenant is made.”186  Even 
under this slightly more liberalized view of the privity requirement, privity 
is never established between a company like Freehold and the successive 
purchasers of the interest in land.  A company like Freehold never actually 
owns an interest in land but instead seemingly owns only a right to receive 
payment upon the transfer of another’s interest.187  Because Freehold would 
never have a possessory interest in the estate, the company cannot be said to 
be in privity with later successive purchasers or sellers.  
Under the fourth view, a jurisdiction should also find that Freehold has 
not created a valid covenant because privity does not exist between the 
parties.188  This view, adopted by the Restatement of Property 3rd, requires 
“privity of either succession of or simultaneous interests between 
covenantor and covenantee and further require[s] some compensating 
benefit to other land justifying the running of the burden.”189  Again, 
Freehold, even at creation of the private transfer fee covenant, never had 
privity through either succession of or simultaneous interests with the 
property owner.  Instead, they created a contract with the developer.   
Under the fifth and most liberal view, an argument can be made that 
privity does exist between the holder of the right to receive a fee and the 
buyer or purchaser of the property.190  This view “merely requires a 
succession of interest on the part of assignees by or against whom the 
covenant is sought to be enforced.”191  In jurisdictions adopting this view, 
privity seems to be more about succession to the title to land as opposed to 
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actual interest.  In these most liberal jurisdictions, Freehold does have a 
colorable argument that a court should hold that they have privity with any 
party who later buys or sells the land affected by the covenant.  
D. Transfer Fee Covenants Violate Public Policy and Should Not Be 
Enforced. 
Because some states already ban or restrict the use of transfer fee 
covenants, it is clear that some legislatures think a transfer fee covenant 
would be enforceable absent a statutory ban.  However, even assuming that 
all previously discussed legal challenges were to fail, a transfer fee 
covenant should not be sustained as a function of public policy.  This is not 
a unique view on the doctrine of covenants, being similar to the view 
espoused in the Restatement of Property 3rd.192  While transferring 
property, especially in our modern society, can be a complex task, allowing 
companies like Freehold to patent and then use transfer fee covenants will 
only make a transfer more complex.  At times when buyers and sellers 
already require professionals for almost every step of the process, transfer 
fee covenants threaten to make what is already a seemingly impossible task 
into one that is even harder to accomplish without legal and other 
professional involvement in the selling or buying of real property.  
Additionally, it is unfair as a matter of public policy to burden future 
homeowners with transfer fee covenants.  For all the basic reasons 
mentioned above, homeowners will be burdened and potentially unable to 
sell their land if states continue to allow transfer fee covenants to be used 
by private parties to bind homeowners.  This is especially troublesome if 
“stacking” of transfer fee covenants is allowed.  A homeowner might 
encounter several transfer fees which must be paid to several different 
private parties.  This would undoubtedly reduce the alienability of the land 
as well as simply make buying and selling the land more difficult for the 
homeowner.  Homeowners tend to be unsophisticated, at least compared to 
professional title experts, and assuming that a new homeowner will 
understand a private transfer fee covenant may simply be irrational, even if 
the covenant is disclosed.  This becomes even more true if the covenants 
are stacked.  While a deed generally must detail any covenants, conditions, 
easements, equitable servitudes, mineral rights, leases, or other 
encumbrances, a general reference like “subject to all restrictions of record” 
will often suffice legally but does not give a buyer adequate warning of the 
consequences of transfer fee covenants, except in those states which have 
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taken a positive step to require actual notice to the buyer.193  As a matter of 
public policy, our society favors the alienability of land and clear title.  For 
the same reasons, public policy should protect homeowners from 
unexpected and sometimes very large fees, which may keep them from 
transferring their interest in the land to another party. 
Also, as a matter of public policy, states should be concerned that 
homeowners are not receiving adequate notice of transfer fee covenants.  
Many other covenants, like those used by homeowners’ associations, raise 
concerns about notice which can be analogized to the problems likely to 
occur with private transfer fee covenants.  Generally, one would assume 
that private fees placed on the land by a homeowners’ association are 
visible and people tend to know the likely restrictions.  However, even 
when the homeowner can visually see some of the restrictions in place 
because of the covenant, i.e. cut grass or no signs, notice issues still arise as 
to other aspects of the covenant.194 
The first major concern with homeowners’ association fees is that the 
“daunting stack of papers presented to the buyer at closing” prevents the 
buyer from having actual notice of the covenant.195  This concern quite 
obviously carries over to other kinds of covenants, especially those even 
less visible than a homeowners’ association, like the private transfer fees 
advanced by Freehold. 
Second, Hannah Wiseman posits that many new home buyers simply 
look at the covenants as “general” and never really think that they will be 
enforced.196  Again, this same issue arises with respect to the use of private 
transfer fees, like the one proposed by Freehold, because potential 
homeowners may never thoroughly read or understand an obscure covenant 
that they are signing along with all of the other paperwork in the large stack 
of closing paperwork.  As mentioned above, while a deed generally must 
detail any covenants or encumbrances, a general reference like “subject to 
all restrictions of record” is often used, and this does not give a buyer 
adequate warning of the possible covenants.197  Finally, the title insurance 
commitment will show a private transfer fee as an exception from the 
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policy, but most people do not know how to read either the title insurance 
commitment or the documents listed as an exception. 
Third, many homeowners are not made aware of the covenants attached 
to the home while in the buying process.198  Instead, it is not until much 
later, and often too late, that the homeowner is told about the transfer fee, or 
other covenant, on their property.199  This is worrisome in the context of a 
private transfer fee, which will require a large sum of money from the buyer 
later and may even inhibit fully informed buyers from wanting to purchase 
the property.  
Finally, the last major problem asserted by Hannah Wiseman is that the 
real estate agents, often in haste to make a sale, do not mention or fully 
explain the covenants even if the covenants are correctly disclosed.200  For 
example, Wiseman notes that while the common law of covenants 
developed primarily because of notice concerns, and while state legislation 
ensures that notice is provided, many homeowners are still completely 
unaware of the existence of the homeowners’ association.201  Thus, 
“[d]espite the several layers of theoretical notice protections in private 
covenanted communities [ ] many homeowners indicate that they were 
unaware of the covenants when they were in the process of purchasing a 
home within these communities.”202  If real estate agents fail to explain a 
homeowners’ association covenant, the likelihood that they will explain a 
complex document which requires property purchase price configurations 
seems to be very low.203  
All of the points made by Hannah Wiseman regarding homeowners’ 
association covenants are magnified when applied to private transfer fees 
used by developers, which are placed on the land for a full ninety-nine 
years and cloud the title if unpaid.204  If a state adopts a public policy of 
protecting homeowners at all, the state cannot allow a homeowner to 
remain unaware of such a threat to their property ownership.  While some 
homeowners may choose the benefits of a private transfer fee, it is unlikely 
that many who actually do buy a home with a private transfer fee attached 
are accurately informed of the implications of that covenant.   
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Therefore, courts should hold that a private transfer fee cannot bind 
future owners as a matter of public policy.  Despite possible legal 
challenges, some jurisdictions may still find that private transfer fees create 
a valid covenant as a matter of law, but courts should turn to an alternative 
public policy rationale to find that they nonetheless create an invalid 
covenant.  In a system that already requires professional help for the lay 
person wishing to purchase a home, it seems unforgivable to require 
homeowners to look out for yet another hurdle before their next purchase.  
Additionally, private transfer fee covenants should be void because they 
violate the basic value of the free alienability of land.  Finally, because 
homeowners often are not given sufficient notice of covenants which run 
with their land, it is contrary to public policy to ask them to bear the burden 
of transfer fee covenants.  
IV. While There May Be Benefits of Transfer Fee Covenants, the Benefits 
Do Not Outweigh the Substantial Problems Created by Allowing Transfer 
Fee Covenants to Be Used in Order to Obtain Private Gain 
Proponents of transfer fee covenants argue that the covenants increase 
the ability to provide affordable housing and promote charitable giving in 
communities as well as provide funds for community growth and 
improvements.205  These proponents “argue that private transfer fees are 
reasonable and benefit both buyers and developers.”206  While some of 
these arguments do have merit, the benefits that are gained through use of 
transfer fee covenants are lackluster and the problems with transfer fee 
covenant use in the private developer context greatly outweigh any of the 
favorable arguments. 
A. Transfer Fee Covenants Do Not Provide for More Affordable Housing 
Joseph Alderman, managing partner of Freehold, says that transfer fee 
covenants are “a means of spreading out costly infrastructure expenses and 
jump-starting half-finished subdivisions hobbled by the housing crisis.”207  
Freehold claims that homes are more affordable after the use of a private 
transfer fee because the covenant will lower the “price, transactional costs 
and carrying costs of the home.”208  The upfront buying costs are reduced 
because the developer has sold the right to be paid the transfer fees and has 
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thereby received income from the property.209  Therefore, the developer can 
afford to sell the home for less.210  However, The Coalition to Stop Wall 
Street Home Resale Fees, which is a group of realtors that backs the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency’s proposal, says that the use of private transfer 
fees “lower[s] a home’s equity, depress[es] home prices and complicate[s] 
the safe, efficient and legal transfer of real estate.”211  
Peter W. Salsich, Jr., an attorney in Irvine, California, suggests that 
private transfer fees finance affordable housing through private 
“endowments,” which “are essentially transfer fees collected when market 
rate housing is sold and then resold.”212  Salsich proposes that “private 
restrictive covenants . . . be used to provide [a] funding mechanism” for 
affordable housing”213 and that the “[b]eneficiaries [of these endowments or 
private transfer fees] would be private not-for-profit organizations.”214  
Again, “[this] proposal calls for the foundations to [get] payments and then 
distribute fees on a pro rata basis to other not-for-profit housing providers, 
such as Habitat for Humanity.”215  The argument is that homeownership 
costs do not increase because the upfront costs of projects and goals are 
reduced, resulting in a greater availability of affordable housing and more 
affordable pricing overall.216 
However, it seems that a clear rebuttal argument on behalf of those 
opposing the imposition of private transfer fees on future private parties is 
that these reasons are not enough to justify binding a future private party 
with a covenant.  While the argument of the proponents of transfer fees is 
noble, opponents have an equally valid argument that transfer fee covenants 
may result in unaffordable housing and that owners should not be burdened 
with recurring payments for each sale of the property.   
The proponents of transfer covenant fees point to the fact that 
“N.I.M.B.Y.,” or not-in-my-back-yard, attitudes push unwanted and 
undesirable facilities or land uses to mostly minority or low-income 
communities.217  The argument is that use of transfer fee covenants to 
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encourage building and funding of communities will help inhibit this from 
happening.218  Again, it hardly seems congruent with sound public policy to 
require possible future owners to shoulder this burden.  Homeowners have 
many other choices if they wish to support worthy causes and they can 
exercise their choice in a way that does not require them to pay for it as a 
third party through a fee upon the sale of their home.  
While current owners may pay less up front for their new property, there 
is no proof, or even a clearly sound economic argument, that the property is 
actually cheaper or that this increases the availability of affordable housing 
to anyone-especially those purchasing the home burdened by the transfer 
fee covenant.  Additionally, there is also no proof that those affected by the 
endowments are able to receive more affordable housing because of the use 
of private transfer fee covenants on nearby residences.   
B. Transfer Fee Covenants Do Not Promote a Sense of Community  
Some argue that private transfer fees, in general, add to the sense of 
community by allowing residents to group themselves.219  For example, it is 
suggested that residents may find ways to use private transfer fees to group 
themselves by common behaviors or, alternatively, by socio-economic 
status.220  When this is done through private transfer fees, especially when 
the entity using the transfer fee is a homeowners’ association, many seem to 
think that this is a positive aspect of the use of transfer fees.221  The same 
arguments made in favor of homeowner’ association fees can be made for 
the use of transfer fees by private parties.  Proponents of transfer fees who 
do not share the same view as the N.I.M.B.Y. proponents, may argue that 
transfer fee covenants should be tolerated because they are similar in kind 
to the homeowners’ association fees.222  
However, private transfer fees, when used solely by private parties, do 
not have the same effects as homeowners’ association fees.223  For example, 
homeowners’ association covenants, which are essentially private 
covenants, allow a sense of community by giving a resident a choice to live 
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in a community that only allows a certain number of yard signs.224  This is 
an entirely different decision and problem than a resident choosing or being 
forced into paying 1% of the purchase price of their home back to a private 
company.225 
In conclusion, while the arguments raised by the proponents of private 
transfer fees seem plausible, the merits do not weigh heavily enough to 
balance out the consequences which befall both the buyer and the 
community in which the property is located.  At the very least, private 
homeowners cannot possibly have sufficient notice, in most cases, to make 
an informed decision about a private transfer fee burdening their property 
for the following ninety-nine years.   
V. A Minority of States Already Restrict the Use of Transfer Fee Covenants, 
and the Remaining States, as Well as the Federal Government Should Enact 
Bans to Protect Both Buyers and Sellers 
Eighteen states have already restricted, in some form, transfer fee 
covenants.226  The federal government also has several transfer fee covenant 
proposals.  One of these proposals would ban transfer covenants in all loans 
financed by federally funded Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.227  As transfer 
fees become more newsworthy and popular and as more state legislatures 
begin to recognize the problems transfer fees could pose, more states will 
likely begin to introduce their own restrictions on the use of transfer fee 
covenants.   
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A. About a Third of the States Already Restrict the Use of Transfer Fee 
Covenants, and Those States Which Have Not Yet Banned Them Will Likely 
Soon Follow the Minority 
As one critic of transfer fee covenants put it: 
Although advocates argue that private transfer fees are 
reasonable and benefit both developers and buyers, these 
arguments are unpersuasive.  Private transfer fee covenants 
create an unjustified impediment to the transfer of affected real 
estate; further, enforcing private transfer fee covenants (and 
thereby lowering the value of the affected real estate) would 
permit a developer to divert a portion of the community’s ad 
valorem tax base to the developer’s private benefit—all outside 
the community’s democratic processes.228 
Eighteen states have adopted statutory provisions directly addressing 
enforceability of transfer fee covenants.229  The states with a statute 
restricting, in some form, transfer fee covenants are:  Arizona, California, 
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, 
and Utah.230  Other states have banned transfer fee covenants outright:  
Florida, Missouri, Oregon, Kansas, Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Utah.231  
Under these states’ bans “private transfer fee covenants imposed after the 
effective dates of the relevant statutes are deemed contrary to public policy 
and void.”232  
Texas adopted a statute in 2007 that purported to prohibit enforcement of 
transfer fee covenants.233  However, transfer fee covenants arguably still are 
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enforceable under the Texas statute because it obliges the seller to pay the 
fee and not the buyer.234  Additionally, Freehold interprets the Texas statute 
to allow transfer fee covenants as long as part of the fee goes to charity.235  
However, these arguments are not valid because they are inconsistent with a 
literal reading of the Texas Restatement.236  Even if the buyer is not liable 
for the fee that accrues, the buyer is still bears the burden of “a fee in 
connection with a future transfer of the property.”237  Additionally, “if the 
seller fails to pay the [transfer covenant] fee, it becomes a lien against the 
land that prevents the buyer from delivering clear title to a subsequent 
purchaser.”238  Finally, reading the statute literally makes it obvious that the 
501(c)(3) exemption should not be used to totally exempt private transfer 
fees from the statute.239  If that were so, it would seemingly negate the 
statute as a whole because all private transfer fees could then be partially 
routed to a charitable organization.  The wording of the statute itself shows 
that it was not intended to provide an exception for any and all private 
                                                                                                                 
property or a third party designated by a transferor of the property a fee in 
connection with a future transfer of the property is prohibited.  A deed 
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transfer fees donated to a charity.  The other exception listed with the 
501(c)(3) exception is the exception for homeowners’ associations.240  It 
seems that Texas simply wanted to protect already common and accepted 
uses of transfer fee covenants.  Additionally, if read very literally, the Texas 
statute only exempts transfer fee covenants that give the totality of the fee 
to a 501(c)(3) charity.241  Thus, the Texas statute does in fact act as a ban on 
private transfer fee covenants on residential property.242 
In contrast, Louisiana does not have a statute directly addressing transfer 
fee covenants, but transfer fee covenants are probably unenforceable under 
Louisiana’s civil law.243  Louisiana civil code “requires that a predial 
servitude (which is analogous to an easement appurtenant) provide a benefit 
to a dominant estate for that servitude to be enforceable.”244  This allows 
personal servitudes, or servitudes in gross, to be enforced only when they 
provide an “advantage,” such as an access right, that could be established as 
a predial servitude.245  Transfer fee covenants, such as those used by 
Freehold, do not provide such an advantage.  Instead, they simply give a 
right to receive payment to a third party.  Therefore, while servitudes in 
gross may be enforced in Louisiana, a private transfer fee covenant does not 
meet this description.  Although Louisiana has not banned private transfer 
fee covenants, their law already seems to have accounted for them and 
made them invalid. 
In sum, over one-third of states have already restricted or banned transfer 
fee covenants.  While this is currently a minority of states, state legislatures 
in the majority of states without a transfer fee covenant ban should enact 
such a restriction in order to protect homebuyers.  Additionally, the federal 
government should follow these states’ leads and protect homeowners by 
regulating the use of private transfer fee covenants.246 
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B. Although California Has Explicitly Allowed Transfer Fee Covenants, It 
Has Restricted their Use 
Restrictions, like those that require that notice be given to any buyer, 
allow companies to continue using transfer fee covenants while mitigating 
some of the negative features.  Private transfer covenants are used for many 
purposes that our society deems good, useful, and normal.  Especially with 
the rise of suburban living, a homeowner may deem any number of land use 
controls perfectly suitable and useful.247  Additionally, many authors who 
have discussed the privatization of public property have argued that private 
transfer fee covenants are helpful and allow people to better control their 
neighborhood and living space in an increasingly crowded environment and 
country.248  This may be why some states are wary of a ban on transfer fee 
covenants and it also may be why some states are willing to consider 
restrictions on transfer fee covenants but unwilling to ban them entirely.   
The only state officially validating transfer fee covenants is California.249  
However, even California adopted some protections including a disclosure 
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the Probate Code. 
 (f) Fees, charges, or payments imposed by lenders or purchasers of loans, as 
these entities are described in subdivision (c) of Section 10232 of the Business 
and Professions Code. 
 (g) Assessments, charges, penalties, or fees authorized by the Davis-Stirling 
Common Interest Development Act (Title 6 (commencing with section 1350) 
of Part (4). 
 (h) Fees, charges or payments for failing to comply with, or for transferring 
the real property prior to satisfying, an obligation to construct residential 
improvements on real property. 
 (i) Any fee reflected in a document recorded against the property on or 
before December 31, 2007, that is separate from any covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions, and that substantially complies with subdivision (a) of Section 
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requirement.250  In California, transfer fee covenants are enforceable against 
successors as long as the person imposing the covenant records a document 
indicating “Payment of Transfer Fee Required” in the chain of title.251  This 
is very similar to one of the federal proposals, which would require full 
disclosure.252  Thus, at least several legislators believe that a disclosure 
requirement would be helpful in protecting homebuyers from the 
detrimental effects of private transfer fees.253  While limitations, like 
requiring notice to homeowners, in these states might not solve all the 
negative implications of private transfer fees, they lessen some of the 
harmful impacts on homeowners and buyers. 
C. Remaining States Should Adopt Either a Ban or Restriction on the Use of 
Transfer Fee Covenants 
While the majority of states have yet to restrict or ban transfer fee 
covenants, this is unsurprising as transfer fee covenants have not been used 
as they currently are by Freehold, for many years.  However, as use of this 
new legal strategy spreads, state legislatures should provide assistance to 
homeowners.  First, states should consider the fact that homeowners are 
rarely provided adequate or sufficient notice of a transfer fee covenant.  
This should be the first issue a state addresses regarding transfer fee 
covenants.  Second, states should consider banning transfer fee covenants, 
as used by private buyers and developers, in whole or in part because of 
their deleterious effects. 
1. States Should Immediately Be Concerned With Providing Notice 
As discussed above, a major concern with transfer fee covenants is 
inadequate notice for homeowners.  This is especially significant given that 
the “common law of covenants evolved in large part in response to notice 
concerns.”254  Because of this, states which have yet to enact notice 
                                                                                                                 
1098.5 by providing a prospective transferee notice of the following: 
 (1) Payment of a transfer fee required. 
 (2) The amount or method of calculation of the fee. 
 (3) The date or circumstances under which the transfer fee payment 
requirement expires, if any. 
 (4) The entity to which the fee will paid. (5) The general purposes for which 
the fee will be used. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098 (West 2008). 
 250. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 24; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098 (West 2008).  
 251. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 24. 
 252. Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure Act of 2010, H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 253. Id.  
 254. Id. 
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requirements may want to first consider this intermediary step before 
deciding whether to ban or restrict transfer fees altogether.   
Private transfer fees have many uses and the idea of a private transfer fee 
covenant has been used for many years in property law.255  However, prior 
uses of transfer fees, like those involved with a homeowners’ association, 
are much different than the private transfer fee used and patented by 
Freehold and other similar companies.  For example, when a resident 
moves into a new home or new area, the existence of a homeowners’ 
association and what flows from membership is seemingly known or at 
least knowable.256  Even if new homeowners are unaware of a specific fee, 
they presumably have an idea of what homeowners’ associations are, that 
they exist, and that their land may be burdened by payment to a 
homeowners’ association.257  Furthermore, because of this basic knowledge, 
when homeowners become aware of the fee, they are often unsurprised or 
find that the fee is so low that their lack of knowledge was not so 
unbearable as to keep them from buying the property at all.258  For example, 
in one instance a homeowner found out about the homeowners’ association 
dues much later in the contract signing stage than he would have liked.259  
However, upon finding out that the dues were only twenty-one dollars a 
month, paid twice a year, he decided to go ahead with the purchase 
anyway.260  This is evidence that homeowners, even without actual notice, 
tend to have a more ready understanding of covenants used with 
homeowners’ associations.   
Additionally, a resident can almost always see, upon arriving in the 
community or near the home, what requirements may be part of 
homeowners’ association covenants.261  While homeowners may not have 
notice of specific rules, which can sometimes be problematic, they do tend 
to have a visual of what the homeowners’ association requirements and 
dues might entail.262 
However, the same cannot be said for private transfer covenant fees used 
by a private developer to place a covenant on the land for the next ninety-
nine years.  First, most homeowners, especially those without a legal 
                                                                                                                 
 255. See Fennell, supra note 193, at 829-30.   
 256. See Wiseman, supra note 192, at 743-51; see also Fennell, supra note 193. 
 257. See Wiseman, supra note 192, at 747-48. 
 258. See id. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See Wiseman, supra note 192, at 743-51; see also Fennell, supra note 193. 
 262. See Wiseman, supra note 192, 743-51. 
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background, have probably never heard of a private transfer fee.  Second, 
even with prior knowledge of what a covenant or, more specifically, a 
private transfer fee covenant is, many homeowners are unlikely to know the 
details of how such a covenant functions and how it may burden their land 
for a long period of time. 
The obligation to pay the transfer fee may not always be readily apparent 
and any state which has not already limited transfer fees should follow 
states like California, which have made disclosure a mandatory condition of 
any property transfer including a private transfer fee covenant. 
2. State Legislatures Should Ban or Restrict Private Transfer Fees 
While homeowners should act to protect themselves when purchasing a 
home by reading all documents and employing the necessary professionals, 
the government should also step in and ban or restrict the use of private 
transfer fee covenants.  Freehold claims that a multitude of property types 
can benefit from the use of private transfer fees:  “office buildings, mixed-
use projects, hotels/motels, apartment complexes, retail centers, warehouse 
facilities, industrial facilities, condominiums, residential subdivi-
sions . . . .”263  Most potential buyers of these types of properties have the 
sophistication and legal knowledge to make a full assessment of the 
benefits of contracting with a company like Freehold.  However, most 
homebuyers lack similar sophistication to understand the implications of a 
private transfer fee covenant.264  Often, a home is the biggest purchase a 
person will make in a lifetime and such a purchaser is likely to be much less 
sophisticated than the developer or company who is attempting to use the 
covenant.  Additionally, the purchaser will not feel the effects of the private 
transfer fee until required to pay it years later upon the sale of the 
property.265  All of these factors put homeowners and buyers in a weaker 
position than that described by those positing that the use of transfer fee 
covenants will have obvious benefits for everyone.266  Instead, it seems 
much more likely that the only party benefiting from the use of a private 
transfer fee covenant is the company and holder of the right to receive 
payment.   
States often step in to protect consumers in similar situations.  For 
example, “lemon laws” in states like Oklahoma protect consumers from 
                                                                                                                 
 263. FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 77. 
 264. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 265. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 77.   
 266. Id. 
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faulty new cars.267  These laws attempt to avert surprise when new cars do 
not conform to the reasonable expectations of purchasers.268  Similarly, 
consumers who are taken by surprise by a private transfer fee should be 
protected.  Also, a “lemon law” comes into effect to protect consumers 
when the car defect substantially interferes with the use of the car.269  
Likewise, since the private transfer fee imposes such a hefty cost upon the 
homeowner, the homeowner should be protected from such a surprise at the 
time it first arises.  While states cannot and likely should not protect 
homeowners from covenants already signed and in place, they should 
protect future homeowners from falling into the same trap.  While some 
potential buyers may have the ability to protect themselves from the 
undesired effects of a private transfer fee, homebuyers on the whole do not.  
States and the federal government should protect homebuyers from 
sophisticated attempts to make a profit off of consumers’ lack of 
knowledge. 
D. As the Use Of Private Transfer Fees Becomes More Wide-Spread, It Is 
Likely that More States and the Federal Government Will Follow the 
Suggestions of This Comment and Ban or Restrict Their Use 
Notably, “as use of private transfer fee covenants has accelerated, both 
the National Association of Realtors (NAR) and the American Land Title 
Association (ALTA) have adopted comparable policy statements against 
the use and enforcement of private transfer fee covenants.”270  The 
American Land Title Association’s statement says “these covenants provide 
no benefit to consumers or the public, but rather cost consumers money, 
complicate the safe, efficient and legal transfer of real estate, and depress 
home prices.”271  The statement released by The National Association of 
Realtors says “such fees decrease affordability, serve no public purpose, 
and provide no benefit to property purchasers, or the community in which 
the property is located.”272  Both the National Association of Realtors and 
                                                                                                                 
 267. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 901 (2009).   
 268. See id. 
 269. See id. 
 270. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 24. 
 271. Private Transfer Fee Covenant, AM. LAND TITLE ASS’N  (Apr. 19, 2010), http:// 
www.alta.org/advocacy/docs/PrivateTransferFeeCovenant_OnePager.pdf. 
 272. Legislative Update, MISSISSIPPI ASS’N OF REALTORS), http://www.comvest.net/docu 
ments/MARLegislativeUpdateFeb2011.pdf.   
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the American Land Title Association are “seeking to introduce in state 
legislatures a model statute banning transfer fee covenants.”273   
The model statute introduced by the National Association of Realtors 
and the American Land Title Association would invalidate transfer fee 
covenants added after the statute’s effective date, but not those before the 
effective date.274  A court facing a challenge to covenants that precede the 
statute should evaluate their enforceability against successors based on the 
common law of covenants and servitudes and “ought to conclude that such 
a covenant does not run with the land to bind successors.”275 
The Federal Housing Finance Agency’s proposed ban would affect most 
states because of the influence of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other 
government owned lenders.  The proposal would prohibit Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks from investing in 
mortgages on properties with private transfer fee covenants.276  Its guidance 
applies to mortgages and securities purchased by those banks or acquired as 
collateral for advances and to mortgages and securities purchased by Fannie 
Mae or Freddie Mac.277  The proposed guidance for government sponsored 
enterprises was published August 16, 2010.278  The Federal Housing 
Finances Agency expresses concerns regarding transfer fee covenants, 
saying that the covenants may increase cost of homeownership, hamper 
affordability, reduce liquidity in both primary and secondary mortgage 
markets, limit transfers or render them legally uncertain, and expose 
lenders, title companies, and secondary market participants to risks from 
unknown potential liens and title defects.279   
Transfer fee covenants may reduce transparency because they often are 
not disclosed by sellers and are difficult to discover through customary title 
searches, especially by successive purchasers.280  As these problems 
become more widely recognized, the number of states banning or restricting 
the use of transfer fee covenants continues to grow.  Just recently, North 
Dakota Senators Grindberg, Lee, and Robinson and Representatives 
Gruchalla, Klemin, and Louser introduced a state bill proposing a 
                                                                                                                 
 273. Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 24. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See id. at 24-25. 
 276. FHFA Proposes Ban on GSE Investments in Loans on Properties with Private 
Transfer Fee Covenants, HDR CURRENT DEVS., Aug. 23, 2010, available at 38 NO. CD-17 
HDRCURDEV 19 (Westlaw).  
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prohibition on the use of private transfer fees.281  Furthermore, a founder of 
National Association of Land Title Examiners and Abstractors and 
SourceofTitle.com, Robert Franco, predicts that another ten states, at least, 
will follow suit in 2011.282  Mr. Franco has catalogued the private transfer 
fee covenant evolution on his blog for years.283  While he may not be 
correct about the number of states, his prediction has ample basis for 
support.  Even federal legislators have introduced two bills restricting or 
banning private transfer fees.284  Also, at the beginning of 2010, only six 
states banned private transfer fees; however, by the end of that year, the 
number had grown to sixteen.285   
Therefore, while only a minority of states ban or restrict the use of 
private transfer fees, the remaining states and the federal government 
should follow their lead.  First, the majority of the states are likely to at 
least consider a proposal to ban private transfer fees in the near future.  
Second, those states which do not ban transfer fee covenants will lack 
protections for homebuyers and homebuyers will feel the repercussions of 
legislative inaction for many years.  Third, if a state wants to avoid a total 
ban, states can follow California’s lead and adopt disclosure requirements 
in order to help homeowners best understand the documents they may sign 
when they purchase their home.  For those states considering proposals to 
ban or restrict private transfer fees, their primary concern should be 
protecting homeowners.  The states can focus on notice or more fully 
protect homeowners through total bans or partial restrictions. 
VI. Transfer Fee Covenants Are a Dangerous and Novel Property Concept 
Which Threatens to Make Purchasing Property Not Only Less Affordable 
but Also a Much More Complicated Process That Threatens Alienability of 
Land and Violates Public Policy Concerns 
Transfer fee covenants are a sizeable step away from historical property 
or contract law.  Transfer fee covenants are made when a developer adds a 
covenant to a deed, generally, which requires payment of a fee.  This fee 
must be paid from the new buyer back to the developer.  The fee is 
                                                                                                                 
 281. S. 2149, 62th Leg. (N.D. 2011).   
 282. Robert Franco, My Predictions for 2011, SOURCE OF TITLE BLOG (Jan. 1, 2011), 
http://www.sourceoftitle.com/blog_node.aspx?uniq=736.  
 283. See generally Robert Franco, SOURCE OF TITLE BLOG, http://www.sourceoftitle.com. 
 284. Homeowner Equity Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 6260, 111th Cong. (2009-2010). 
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generally 1% of the sale price, which is re-calculated every time the 
property is sold to a new buyer for the next ninety-nine years.   
Companies like Freehold are selling this device as an easy and 
continuously lucrative alternative to requiring the first buyer to bear all of 
the cost.  However, this is dangerous as it may inhibit alienability of land.  
Additionally, it seems to be a covenant which violates the law of covenants.  
First, it does not touch and concern the land.  Second, privity is never 
established.  Third, it seems to allow the developer or holder of the right to 
obtain payment and to retain a right to the property without having any 
actual right to possession. 
Finally, as a matter of public policy, transfer fee covenants violate the 
most basic understandings of property law, especially clear title.  Transfer 
fees threaten to cloud title and to make it all too difficult to transfer 
property.  Our society values the alienability of land and clear title, and 
private transfer fees potentially make it much more difficult for a buyer, 
and later a seller, to transfer land.  Additionally, buyers may be mostly, or 
even completely, unaware of the fact that a private transfer fee covenant is 
attached to the land they are purchasing.  As with other types of covenants, 
homeowners typically do not realize or understand what is attached to the 
land, and this is especially problematic when the covenant requires a large 
sum to be paid to a private party before the land can be re-sold and attaches 
to that land for a long period of time:  ninety-nine years.   
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